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Evolved to be irrational? Evolutionary and cognitive foundations of pseudosciences 
By Stefaan Blancke & Johan De Smedt 
Introduction 
People believe the weirdest of things. Forty percent of the US population endorses the claim 
that Earth and all life on it has been created by God six to ten thousand years ago (Newport, 
2010); three in four Americans accept some form of paranormal belief such as astrology or 
extra-sensory perception (Moore 2005). Europeans are no less gullible: two Britons in five 
believe that houses can be haunted and one in five thinks that aliens have visited our planet at 
some point in the past (Lyons 2005). Pseudo-medical treatments such as homeopathy are 
widely practised and in some countries like Belgium even refunded by health care. 
Horoscopes can be consulted in numerous popular magazines and newspapers. In sum, there 
seems to be no end to the irrational propensities of the human mind. 
 In this chapter, we intend to examine how an evolutionary and cognitive perspective 
might shed some light on the pervasiveness and popularity of irrational beliefs that make up 
pseudosciences. As such, this contribution will consist of four parts. First, we will set up the 
general theoretical framework, explaining what an evolutionary and cognitive approach 
entails. Second, we will explore how this framework adds to our understanding of why the 
human mind is so vulnerable to systematic reasoning errors. Third, we will demonstrate how 
concrete pseudosciences tap into particular cognitive dispositions. And, fourth, we will 
explain why a number of irrational beliefs take on the form of pseudosciences. To conclude, 
we will turn to the question we have put in our title and briefly discuss how the evolution of 
the mind relates to human (ir)rationality. 
 
The evolved mind 
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The idea that the human mind can be regarded as a product of evolution was already proposed 
by Charles Darwin. In his seminal work On the Origin of Species, in which there is little 
mention of human evolution, he professed that ―psychology will be based on a new 
foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by 
gradation‖ (Darwin 1859, 488). Twelve years later, in the Descent of Man, Darwin (1871) 
argued that humans share particular cognitive faculties with other animals, differing only in 
degree, which showed that the mind had indeed evolved. But for more than 100 years, despite 
the enormous potential for explaining human thought and behaviour, Darwin‘s radically new 
approach to the human mind was largely ignored, notwithstanding a few unsuccessful and 
premature attempts to darwinize psychology, such as Freudian psychoanalysis. This situation 
changed during the second half of the previous century with the development of cognitive 
ethology, sociobiology and evolutionary psychology.  
 Evolutionary psychology emerged from several scientific traditions, synthesizing 
elements from research fields such as cognitive science, cognitive ethology and sociobiology 
(Tooby & Cosmides 2005), as a consequence of the evidence that had been accumulating in 
those fields. It challenged the prevailing paradigm in the social sciences, identified by Tooby 
and Cosmides (1992) and others (e.g., Pinker 2002) as the Standard Social Science Model, 
which regards the human mind as a blank slate with a small number of general-purpose 
learning mechanisms that can be inscribed with any content culture provides (Pinker 2002; 
Tooby & Cosmides 1992).  
Instead, this new evidence suggests that the human mind consists of a number of domain-
specific, specialized mental inference systems that evolved in response to specific adaptive 
problems our ancestors had to solve during their evolutionary history. These were mainly 
problems dealing with survival, mating and sex, kinship and parenting, and group living (Buss 
2008). One school of thought in evolutionary psychology (e.g., Pinker 1997) holds that 
cognitive evolution has not kept pace with cultural developments: the circumstances in which 
humans live have altered dramatically since the early Holocene (due to, for example, the 
invention of farming and the Industrial Revolution), but, according to evolutionary 
psychologists, our evolved mind is still mainly adapted to a hunter-gatherer way of life. 
Human evolution did not stop in the Pleistocene, as is evident, for example, in mutations in 
enzymes that allow the digestion of starchy food and dairy products (e.g., Perry et al. 2007), 
but evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides 1992) contend that the pace of 
cultural evolution over the last 10,000 years has outstripped that of organic evolution, so that 
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human cognitive adaptations are still to a large extent fitted to a hunter-gatherer lifestyle. 
There has been some tentative genetic evidence for ongoing cognitive evolution over the past 
few thousand years (e.g., Evans et al. 2005; Mekel-Bobrov et al. 2005), but these findings 
have not been without criticism (Currat et al. 2006, Yu et al. 2007). The structure of the 
human mind constrains and governs human thought and behaviour in systematic ways. For 
example, people are more wary of spiders than of cars, even though the latter category forms 
a far bigger risk to one‘s health than the former in most human lives.  
 What is of interest here is that the mind has been endowed with cognitive dispositions 
that were largely adaptive: they offered the ability to produce representations of particular 
aspects of the world which allowed humans to respond quickly and aptly to specific 
situations. These predispositions are often pictured as ―fast and frugal heuristics‖ (Gigerenzer 
et al. 1999) that result in intuitive ways of reasoning that are fast, automatic and largely 
unconscious. To be sure, we do have the feeling that we have control over our thoughts, that 
there is an ―I‖ that does the thinking. This reflective way of thinking, which is mostly 
conscious and functions more slowly in comparison to intuitive reasoning, arises from the 
human capacity to represent representations. Because this meta-representational capacity does 
not deal with the outside world directly, it is regarded by some to be domain-general (e.g., 
Sloman 1996), although according to Sperber (1996), it can be deemed a cognitive 
specialization that has evolved specifically to deal with representations.  Humans do indeed 
seem to possess two distinct ways of processing information, intuitive and reflective, also 
called dual-process reasoning (J. S. B. T. Evans 2010). As we will see further on, this has 
important implications for our understanding of human rationality, and thus, for our present 
discussion of pseudosciences.    
 
The evolution of cognitive bias 
Because the human mind has evolved to deal with adaptive problems in real-life situations, it 
focuses on specific cues in its environment that are relevant for solving these problems, rather 
than generating a perfectly accurate picture of the environment. Thus, we can expect human 
reasoning to exhibit trade-offs between speed and truth-preservation, leading to fast but not 
always reliable heuristics. This prediction has been borne out by ample studies under the 
banner of the ―heuristics and biases‖ program, initiated by Tversky and Kahneman in the 
1970s (for an overview, see Gilovich et al. 2002). Even in solving abstract reasoning tasks, 
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people rely on their intuitive judgment (unless taught otherwise), which leaves them highly 
vulnerable to systematic errors. For instance, when evaluating probabilities, people tend to 
make judgments on the basis of representativeness (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). The effect 
of these heuristics is exemplified by the classical Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman 
1983). Participants are invited to read the following description: ―Linda is 31 years old, 
single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply 
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.‖ Then, they are asked which of the two following options they think is most 
probable: a) Linda is a bank teller, or b) Linda is a bank teller and a feminist. Although a 
conjunction can never be more probable than either of its two constituents, around 85% of 
participants judge that the second option is more likely than the first, arguably because they 
consider the text to be more representative of a feminist than of a bank teller. This has been 
dubbed the ―conjunction fallacy.‖ Fallacies like these have proven to be extremely robust, and 
not easy to weed out (Tentori, et al. 2004). 
 Gigerenzer and colleagues (1999) have argued that the appearance of ―fallacies‖ like 
this does not reflect people‘s failure to think rationally, but rather results from researchers 
appraising people‘s reasoning skills by inappropriate standards. To return to the Linda 
problem, people are supposed to apply a content-free logical rule to arrive at the correct 
answer. The test, however, contains ambiguous terms like ―probable,‖ that trigger 
conversational heuristics that look for intended meaning and relevance, causing subjects to 
understand the word in non-mathematical terms such as ―possible‖ or ―conceivable.‖ When 
asked for a frequency judgment (―How many?‖) instead of a probability judgment, as a result 
of which the ambiguity dissolves, people do infer the mathematical meaning, and the 
conjunction fallacy largely disappears (Hertwig & Gigerenzer 1999). According to 
Gigerenzer (2008), variations on experiments like this confirm that the mind should be 
regarded as a collection of specialized inference systems that have evolved in such a way that 
the human brain responds to the environment quickly, frugally and efficiently.
1
 Hence, 
according to dual-process theories of reasoning, a picture emerges of two forms of rationality. 
On the one hand, there is the slow and reflective mode of rationality that conforms to the 
norms and rules of logic and probability. On the other hand, we have an ―ecological‖ or 
                                                 
1
 However, this view is not widely shared in the psychology of reasoning. For example, Tentori et al. (2004) 
contend that Gigerenzer‘s frequency approach already provides participants with a part of the solution, 
prompting them to conceptualize the problem in terms of frequencies.  
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―bounded rationality‖ that conforms to the adaptive requirements set by the environments in 
which the human species has evolved (Hilton 2002). From this perspective, the appearance of 
irrationality does not result from flawed reasoning, but rather from evaluating the latter form 
of rationality by the standards of the former. However, when intuitive reasoning is applied to 
complex and abstract cognitive problems, irrational reasoning can still result (Haselton, et al. 
2005). The fast and frugal heuristics sometimes lead to error, as they continue to interfere 
with people‘s reflective inferences, in the form of well-attested kinds of irrationality (see 
above).   
 Keeping the above framework in mind, we argue that the tenacity and popularity of 
particular pseudosciences, even in the face of strong adverse evidence, can partly be 
explained by the fact that pseudosciences tap into people‘s intuitive understanding, thereby 
exploiting the mental heuristics that have evolved to respond efficiently to particular 
environmental and social situations. Let us illustrate this point by taking a closer look at one 
of the most pervasive irrational belief systems of today, creationism.     
 
Pseudoscience and content biases: creationism as a case study 
Here, we will use the term ―creationism‖ not in its common sense of Young-Earth 
creationism, but as a form of belief system that contends that there is evidence that God has 
purposively intervened in the natural world, creating or designing entities (species, 
adaptations) that could not have arisen through a naturalistic process. As such, creationism 
not only denotes Young-Earth creationism, but also includes Old-Earth and Intelligent Design 
creationism (Matzke 2010; Scott 2009). Note that each of these variants is presented as 
scientific by its adherents, or at least as scientific as evolutionary theory.  
 Although the various strands of creationism might differ in their theological specifics, 
our use of the term ―creationism‖ depends on the idea that they share a minimal core of 
common assumptions. In the rest of this chapter, we will argue that these core assumptions tie 
in closely with human intuitions concerning the origins and causal structure of the biological 
world. More specifically, creationism exploits or piggy-backs on the human mind‘s 
essentialism, its preference for teleological explanations and its hyperactive tendency to detect 
agency. As we will see, each of these intuitions makes sense from an evolutionary 
perspective.  
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Psychological essentialism 
Essentialism is a hallmark of creationism. It is the view that entities, such as species, possess 
an immutable essence, which guides their development and behavior. Essentialism can be 
described as a fast and frugal heuristic that instantly provides our mind with a rich inductive 
potential, not on the basis of apparent similarities, but on the basis of an unobserved core that 
is believed to cause members of a given category to share particular behavioral and physical 
properties. As such, ―[essentialism] allows one to exploit the causal structure of the world (of 
natural kinds, in particular), without necessarily knowing anything about the causes 
themselves‖ (Barrett 2001, 7).  Historically, essentialism constitutes a major and recurrent 
theme in Western thought at least since Aristotle (Mayr 1982), a clear indication of its 
enduring appeal. Today, students‘ understanding of evolutionary theory is still hindered by 
essentialist inclinations (Shtulman & Schulz 2008): students with the highest essentialist 
tendencies have the least understanding of the mechanism of natural selection. Studies on 
essentialist reasoning in children indicate that this intuition develops early and in the absence 
of instruction, and that it is stable across cultures. Five-year-olds acknowledge that category 
membership remains unaffected by superficial changes. They consider a butterfly to belong to 
the same category as a caterpillar despite the dramatic developmental transformations the 
organism goes through (Gelman 2003). Also, essentialism is not restricted to Western culture: 
Yukatek Maya children reason as much about biological categories in terms of essences as 
children in the United States, a finding that suggests that essentialism is a universal feature of 
the human mind (Atran 2002). Moreover, young children often reason more in an essentialist 
fashion than adults, another indicator that this tendency is a stable part of human cognition 
(Gelman 2004). Although humans are capable of exploiting the causal structure of the world 
in other ways than through essentialism, it provides a quick and efficient heuristic to do so—
for example, if one apple is edible, one can quickly generalize that all are edible; if one tiger 
is dangerous, one can infer that all are dangerous. Interestingly, humans are not the only 
species to use essential reasoning in this adaptive way: rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) 
also infer that superficial changes to the exterior of a fruit do not alter its inside properties 
(Phillips et al. 2010).     
 Evans (2000a, 2001) found that young children until the age of ten have a preference 
for creationist accounts for the origin of species, and this is often accompanied with 
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essentialist thinking.  Creationists believe that God (or a ―designer‖) has created the biological 
world, which is divided into distinct, non-overlapping categories or kinds, the members of 
which share an unobserved essence that makes them belong to that particular category and 
which resists evolutionary change. For instance, in Evolution? The fossils say NO!, Young-
Earth creationist Duane Gish (1978, 43) firmly asserts that ―the human kind always remains 
human, and the dog kind never ceases to be a dog kind. The transformations proposed by the 
theory of evolution never take place.‖ Intelligent Design adherents are no different in this 
regard. Although some claim that they have no issue with common descent, they too state that 
natural selection is limited to micro-evolution, which has always been conceded by 
creationists as limited change within ―kind‖. Towards naturalistic macro-evolution (―the 
molecule-to-man theory‖, in the words of Gish), however, Intelligent Design proponents are 
as skeptical as any other creationist. As one of the leading figures within the Intelligent 
Design movement, biochemist Michael Behe (1996, 15), puts it: ―[T]he canyons separating 
everyday life forms have their counterparts in the canyons that separate biological systems on 
a microscopic scale. [...] Unbridgeable chasms occur even at the tiniest level.‖   
Teleology 
Intuitively, humans not only view the world in terms of essences, but they also assume that 
things in the world happen or exist for a purpose. This teleological tendency reveals itself 
from a young age. Four and five year olds are more inclined to ascribe functions to biological 
wholes and natural objects than adults do. They assume that lions are ―to go in the zoo‖ and 
that clouds are ―for raining‖ (Kelemen 1999a). When asked ―why rocks are so pointy,‖ seven 
to ten year olds prefer a teleological explanation (―so that animals wouldn‘t sit on them and 
smash them‖) over a purely physical explanation (―They were pointy because bits of stuff 
piled up on top of one another for a long time‖, see Kelemen 1999b). The teleological 
tendency wanes with age, which is probably due to the effects of science education. 
Scientifically untrained Romani adults were shown to be more prone to ascribe teleological 
explanations to non-biological natural entities than their educated peers (Casler & Kelemen 
2008). However, evidence suggests that education merely suppresses the teleological 
tendency, which continues to act as a mental default setting throughout the entire lifespan. 
Adults are more likely to endorse teleological explanations (―the sun makes light so that 
plants can photosynthesize‖) when questioned under time pressure (Kelemen & Rosset 2009). 
Also, Alzheimer patients tend to revert to teleological thinking as a result of their condition 
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(Lombrozo, et al. 2007), indicating that the exposure to causal explanations only affects 
people‘s reflective, but not their intuitive beliefs.   
 Understanding biological properties in teleo-functional terms, particularly in 
combination with our capacity to categorize, provides a rich and valuable source of 
information for making inferences about the environment. As such, the teleological stance can 
also be identified as a fast and frugal heuristic that may have added to our adaptive rationality. 
Some philosophers even argue that teleological reasoning forms an indispensable conceptual 
tool for acquiring a solid scientific understanding of the biological world (Ruse 2003). 
Nonetheless, teleological intuitions have also been shown to highly constrain students‘ 
understanding of evolutionary theory. Students tend to mistake natural selection for a goal-
directed mechanism. Or, they assume that evolution as a whole moves towards an end, which 
is commonly identified with the human species (see Bardapurkar 2008 for a review). Like 
essentialism, the teleological stance becomes an easy target for exploitation by irrational 
belief systems when it operates on unfamiliar terrain.  
 In creationist literature, the idea that things in this world exist because of a particular 
purpose is a strong and recurrent theme. In Scientific Creationism, under the subtitle Purpose 
in creation, Henry M. Morris (1974a, 33-34) contends that ―the creation model does include, 
quite explicitly, the concept of purpose‖, and that ―the creationist seeks to ascertain 
purposes.‖ Rhetorically, he asks his readers: 
Do both fish and men have eyes because man evolved from fish or because both fish 
and man needed to see, in order to fulfil their intended creative purpose? Can stars and 
galaxies be arranged in a logical hierarchy of order from one type to another because 
they represent different stages in an age-long evolutionary process, or because they 
were each specially created to serve distinct purposes, such purposes requiring 
different degrees of size and complexity?  
The same notion of purposefulness also resonates throughout the entire Intelligent Design 
literature. In fact, the basic claim of the movement is that complex biological systems can be 
compared with artefacts, implying that they too have been made to serve a particular purpose. 
Often, people‘s teleological intuitions are brought in as a justification for the design inference. 
As William Dembski (1999, 48), another important Intelligent Design proponent, puts it:   
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Intelligent Design formalizes and makes precise something we do all the time. All of 
us are all the time engaged in a form of rational activity which, without being 
tendentious, can be described as ‗inferring design.‘ Inferring design is a perfectly 
common and well-accepted human activity.   
Naturally, being creationists, Morris and Dembski depict the alleged purposes in nature as 
resulting from the intentional actions of a supernatural agent. As such, creationism does not 
only hijack people‘s teleological intuitions, but also taps into the strong inclination of the 
human mind to detect other agents and understand their behaviour as motivated by intentions 
and desires. This makes creationism all the more cognitively appealing. 
 
Detecting agents and the intentional stance 
The human mind is highly prone to detecting agency and it often does so even in the absence 
of agents. Just think of the times you thought there was someone near when it turned out only 
to be some piece of garment hung out to dry on a clothes horse or a bush blown in the wind, 
or of the times you mistook a bag blown by the wind for a bird or a small animal. The 
opposite scenario, however, in which one mistakes an agent for a inanimate object, rarely 
occurs, even though it is in principle possible, e.g., mistaking a person for a mannequin, or a 
bird for a lump of earth and some leaves. At least two good evolutionary reasons have been 
proposed as to why the mind is more likely to produce false positives than false negatives 
when it comes to detecting agency. First, we can expect that agency detection is hyperactive, 
based on game-theoretical considerations involving predator-prey interactions, in particular 
the costs of false positives and negatives and the potential payoffs (Godfrey-Smith 1991). For 
complex organisms that live in variable conditions and that rely on signals in the environment 
that are not always transparent to make decisions, it is far less costly to assume that there is an 
agent when there is none than the other way around (Guthrie 1993)—this is the case not only 
for animals that need to avoid predators, but also for predators looking for potential prey, in 
which case the potential benefit outstrips the costs of a false positive. Because of the 
asymmetry between costs, natural selection favors organisms with an agency detection device 
that occasionally generates false positives rather than false negatives. Second, agency 
detection is not only related to predator-prey interactions, but is also highly relevant for the 
detection of the attention of conspecifics. Being watched may have consequences for one‘s 
reputation. Any reputational damage might entail a decrease in cooperation opportunities, 
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thus limiting access to vital resources which, in turn, affects reproductive success. This 
provides a plausible scenario for why the human mind is hypersensitive to cues of being 
watched by other agents. For example, a picture of two eyes suffices to induce people to put 
more money in a donation box (Bateson, et al. 2006), or leave significantly less litter in a 
canteen (Ernest-Jones, et al. 2011); stylized eyespots on a computer screen or an eye-like 
painting significantly increase generosity in a Dictator Game (Haley & Fessler 2005; Oda et 
al. 2011). 
 Evolutionary psychologists argue that the human mind has an evolved capacity to 
interpret the behavior of other agents as motivated by internal states, such as intentions and 
beliefs. Adopting the ―intentional stance‖ (Dennett 1987) allows one to predict the behavior 
of complex organisms.  To account for the origin of this capacity, two scenarios have been 
proposed—they are related to the scenarios set out above explaining human hypersensitivity 
to the presence of other agents. One is that the intentional stance has evolved in order to deal 
with complex social interactions. This Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis traces the 
evolution of human mind reading in the complex social interactions that most primates 
engage in. Given the large group sizes in humans compared to other primates, humans require 
more sophisticated mindreading skills to successfully interact with group members (see e.g., 
Byrne 1996; Humphrey 1976). The other suggests that this stance has evolved in relation to 
predator-prey interactions: the ability to remain undetected by predators, or to find prey 
requires that one is able to accurately predict what other agents will do (Barrett 2005; Boyer 
& Barrett 2005). For the purpose of this chapter, we need not decide between these 
hypotheses, which are also not mutually exclusive. The human mind does not only have the 
capacity to interpret the behavior of agents in term of their intentions, it also forms 
expectations as to what agents are capable of, in particular in relation to inanimate objects. 
Ten-month-old babies assume that only agents create order out of chaos (Newman et al. 
2010), and 10- to 12-month-olds expect an object‘s movement only to be caused by a human 
hand, not by an inanimate object (Saxe et al. 2005). These inferences add to the rich 
explanatory power that comes with human intuitive psychology, or theory of mind.  
 This intuitive psychology is easily triggered. Adults have been shown to overattribute 
intentions to purely natural events. Sentences like ―she broke the vase‖ are by default 
interpreted as describing an intentional act, not something that happened by accident (Rosset 
2008). However, it is unclear whether folk psychological intuitions are also invoked by and 
connected with the teleological intuitions discussed above. In the case of artefacts, there is an 
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obvious link between the purpose of the artefact and the intention for making it, which results 
in the ―design stance‖ (Dennett 1987). For instance, both children and adults privilege 
creator‘s intent over later afforded usage when deciding which function to attribute to an 
artefact (Chaigneau, et al. 2008; Kelemen 1999a. But concerning the natural world, the 
connection between the teleological and intentional stance is far less apparent. Both Evans 
(2000b) and Kelemen and DiYanni (2005) have established a link between these two stances 
in 7- to 10-year-old children from the USA and the UK respectively, independently of their 
being raised in a religious cultural environment. Based on these findings Kelemen (2004) 
coined the term ―intuitive theists,‖ meaning that these children intuitively project an agent 
who is responsible for creating the world. However, the Dutch children that were probed by 
Samarapungavan and Wiers (1997) for their beliefs concerning the origins of species did not 
express such a creationist inclination. Furthermore, in the aforementioned studies with 
Alzheimer patients (Lombrozo et al. 2007) and adults under time pressure (Kelemen & Rosset 
2009), the teleological and intentional stance were not clearly correlated. Alzheimer patients, 
despite their increased endorsement of teleological explanations, were not more likely to 
invoke God as an explanation compared to healthy control subjects. People who were more 
likely to endorse teleological explanations under time pressure were not more likely to believe 
in God. In sum, intuitive teleology cannot be equated with intuitive theism (De Cruz & De 
Smedt 2010). It seems that people‘s creationist intuitions are not as deeply ingrained as their 
teleological intuitions.  
  Even though theism is not intuitive in the sense of being an innate, untutored 
intuition, it is nevertheless easy to grasp and natural for minds like ours, that are 
hypersensitive to the actions of agents, that readily infer intentionality, and that consider only 
agents to be capable of creating movement and order. The suggestion that the world is the 
result of a creative act by a hidden supernatural agent is something that makes intuitive sense. 
Indeed, creationists insist that the intentions of such an agent can be read off from both the 
order and the beauty in the universe and the functional complex systems found in nature. For 
instance, Morris (1974a, 33) writes: 
The Creator was purposive, not capricious or indifferent, as He planned and then 
created the universe, with its particles and molecules, its laws and principles, its stars 
and galaxies, its plants and animals, and finally its human inhabitants.   
And, also: 
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The creationist explanation will be in terms of primeval planning by a personal 
Creator and His implementation of that plan by special creation of all the basic entities 
of the cosmos, each with such structures and such behavior as to accomplish most 
effectively the purpose for which it was created. 
Hence, creationists compare the bacterial flagellum with an outboard rotary motor (Behe 
1996), and conceptualize DNA as some kind of code, programmed by an intelligent designer 
(Davis et al. 1993; H. M. Morris 1974b). In biology school books, artefact metaphors are 
commonly used as explanatory tools to make sense of complex biological systems, which 
points to their strong intuitive appeal. However, because of this appeal, they can become an 
alluring piece of rhetorical equipment in the hands of creationists, who intend these metaphors 
to be taken quite literally (Pigliucci & Boudry 2011). 
Discussion 
Although we have limited our discussion of mental predispositions exploited by creationism 
to the essentialist, teleological and intentional biases, there may be other biases at play as 
well. For instance, the intuitions that humans are fundamentally different from other animals 
(De Cruz & De Smedt 2007), and that mind and body belong to two separate ontological 
domains (Bloom 2004; Slingerland & Chudek 2011) are other good candidates to explain 
widespread pseudoscientific thinking. Also, we have only demonstrated how creationism 
piggybacks on those inference systems, but we hold that the same reasoning goes for other 
pseudosciences as well. Essentialism, for instance, may contribute to explaining the 
persistence of homeopathy (Hood 2008)—even if a substance is diluted to the point that it is 
no longer chemically detectable, our intuitive essentialism can lead to the mistaken intuition 
that the essence of the product is still there. Note, however, that we do not intend to debunk 
the beliefs that make up pseudosciences simply by demonstrating that the latter tap into 
people‘s evolved intuitions. Doing so in a straightforward way would be committing the 
genetic fallacy. One could try to set up a debunking argument by claiming that our evolved 
inference systems are systematically off-track or unreliable, but this does not seem to be the 
case. After all, these cognitive predispositions at least produce ecologically rational solutions 
to recurrent problems the human mind has evolved to solve. Furthermore, scientific beliefs 
too rely on intuitive assumptions. For example, scientists share with young children (e.g. Saxe 
et al. 2005) the intuition that any contingent state of affairs has one or more causes to account 
for it. The search for (often non-obvious) causes is part of our intuitive understanding of the 
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world that is continuous between scientific and everyday reasoning (De Cruz & De Smedt in 
press). Hence, if dependence on evolved biases would count as a debunking argument, 
scientific beliefs would also be susceptible to debunking arguments, a conclusion we 
obviously do not want to draw. Rather, a cognitive and evolutionary approach to 
pseudosciences helps to explain why people steadfastly adhere to such belief systems, even in 
the face of strong defeating evidence.   
 
Context biases, or why pseudoscience? 
Irrational (reflective) belief systems tend to mimic real sciences, sometimes down to the 
smallest detail. Biblical creationism has developed into scientific creationism or Intelligent 
Design, osteopathy and the like are presented as alternative treatments on a par with modern 
medicine, and contemporary vitalistic theories use scientific terms like ―energy‖ to leave a 
scientific impression. Obviously, these pseudosciences piggyback on the authority science has 
been endowed with in modern society. The question remains as to why it is so important for 
pseudosciences to seek that authority and, also, why they often succeed in attaining it. Again, 
an evolutionary and cognitive perspective can shed some light on these issues. 
 Humans are social rather than individual learners: they gain significantly more 
information through communication with conspecifics than by direct experience with the 
environment. Although the benefits of social learning, the extent of which is unique to 
humans, are huge (one has access to much more information at a much lower cost), such a 
capacity would not have evolved if humans did not have ways to protect themselves from 
being misinformed. Therefore, Mercier and Sperber (2011) have argued that humans are 
critical social learners, who exhibit epistemic vigilance with regard to socially transmitted 
information: they critically evaluate both the content and the source of the information 
received. As to the latter, both cues that signal competence and benevolence are important, 
although these are less easy to trace when one is confronted with information that is 
transmitted via cultural communication. As a result, the epistemic vigilance provided by the 
heuristics that track such cues might break down (Sperber et al. 2010). To deal with the 
resulting uncertainty and to restore protection against false beliefs, a predisposition might 
have evolved to trust epistemic authorities, that is individuals (or, by extension, institutions) 
other people defer to as being competent and benevolent sources of information (Henrich & 
Gil-White 2001). Hence, people may put their epistemic trust in authorities, simply for the 
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reason that the latter are commonly acknowledged as such. Why has science come to enjoy 
this epistemic authority? Undoubtedly, the tremendous instrumental efficacy of science, in the 
form of, for instance, medicine and communication technology, has been an important factor 
in its widespread public acceptance. However, it is important to point out that this trust is not 
universal and that in some communities people defer to religious authorities as a source of 
reliable information (Kitcher 2008). Religion is historically and socially well-embedded in 
these communities, where it enjoys public support and is also endorsed in education 
(denominational education, Sunday school). If people indeed place their epistemic trust in 
science, why is this trust not universal, and why are some pseudosciences like creationism 
widely endorsed? One reason is that creationists successfully present themselves as 
scientifically legitimate. Many of their proponents have a PhD, and publish books and papers 
in scientific fields. Given that their claims enjoy the extra advantage of being in line with our 
evolved cognitive predispositions, such as essentialism, teleology and the intentional stance—
whereas real science often runs counter to these intuitions—they can successfully win 
converts among the general public.  
 
Conclusions 
Let us return to the question in the title. Are we evolved to be irrational? Given the ubiquity 
of pseudosciences, this seems a fair question to ask. However, from an evolutionary 
perspective, we should at least expect some rationality in ecologically relevant domains. The 
representations an evolved mind generates should at least allow an organism to respond aptly, 
and thus rationally, to environmental situations. The human mind is stacked with fast and 
frugal heuristics, the operations of which result in an adaptive, ecological rationality. 
However, when these heuristics operate outside their proper domain in solving abstract and 
complex cognitive problems that require a reflective mode of thinking, their output becomes 
subjugated to the normative rationality of logic and probability theory. Hence, when their 
impact on reflective thinking remains unchecked, we are likely to endorse irrational beliefs. 
The tendency to endorse pseudosciences increases when they are given an air of scientific 
respectability, which allows them to take advantage of the epistemic authority that scientific 
theories enjoy. Therefore, to answer our title question, although we could not have evolved to 
be irrational, sometimes people are irrational because we have evolved. 
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